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Forward-looking measures of eﬀective taxation aim to measure the impact of
taxation on investment projects, given speciﬁc assumptions on future taxa-
tion and corporate strategies.1 Although forward-looking eﬀective tax rates
(ETRs) should be based on future hypothetical behaviour, quite surprisingly,
the existing indicators do not take into account many future events, that
usually characterize a company’s life. In particular, though it is recognized
t h a tt h ec h o i c eo faﬁnancial source can aﬀect the value of an investment
project, existing literature provides a poor analysis of ﬁnancial aspects. To
our knowledge, existing measures of ETR usually disregard debt maturity,
the existence of collateral, as well as a company’s ability to issue hybrid
securities. These limits are recognized by Devereux (2003), who says that
"there are many other forms of ﬁnancial contract that have elements of debt
and equity ﬁnance by which a company can raise ﬁnance. These include, for
example, swaps and various forms of option that the literature on measuring
eﬀective tax rates has not yet incorporated".
The aim of this article is to provide a theoretical framework that enables
us to calculate ETRs under diﬀerent kinds of debt ﬁnance. To do so, we will
apply a standard contingent-claim model and will calculate the ETR under
two forms of debt ﬁnance, i.e., secured and unsecured debt. Moreover, we will
measure the ETR under the assumption that a company issues well-known
hybrid securities, such as convertible and reverse convertible bonds.2 We will
therefore show that eﬀective taxation crucially depends on the characteristics
of debt, and the ability to convert debt into equity.3 Moreover, we will see
that, by disregarding expected future events, the existing measures of ETR
are dramatically biased.
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and discusses its assumptions. Section 3 provides a measure of the ETR under
both secured and unsecured debt ﬁnance. Section 4 measures the ETR by
assuming the issue of convertible and reverse convertible bonds. Section 5
1For a discussion on eﬀective tax rates and their applications, see e.g. Giannini and
Maggiulli (2002), and Sørensen (2003).
2Our approach is similar to that applied by Gray et al. (2008), who provide a
contingent-claim analysis of public sector debt sustainability.
3It is well-known that hybrid securities are often issued to avoid taxation (see, e.g.,
McDonald, 2004) and to reduce agency conﬂicts (see, e.g., Hennessy and Tserlukevich,
2005; Ross, 2005). However, these topics are beyond the scope of this article.
1provides some numerical results. Section 6 summarizes our main ﬁndings,
and proposes some possible extensions.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section we introduce a model describing the ﬁnancial and investment
strategies of a risk-neutral company. We assume that a company starts to
earn a payoﬀ Πt once a depreciable investment cost, denoted as I,h a sb e e n
paid.4 This payoﬀ evolves according to the following geometric Brownian
motion
dΠt = σΠtdzt, with Π0 > 0,( 1 )
where σ is the instantaneous standard deviation and dzt is the increment of
a standard Wiener process.5 For simplicity, hereafter we will omit the time
variable.
Capital markets and debt Let us ﬁrst assume that risk is fully diversiﬁ-
able, credit markets are perfectly competitive, and information is symmetric.
As regards debt, we know that it may cause both costs and beneﬁts. On
one hand, debt ﬁnance may lead to default6 and agency conﬂicts between
shareholders and debtholders. On the other hand, the tax deductibility of
interest payments ensures a saving to levered companies (Modigliani and
Miller, 1963; Leland, 1994).7
When a company does not meet its debt obligation, default takes place.
In this case, shareholders are expropriated by the lender. Let us next deﬁne
4For simplicity, we assume that a ﬁrm cannot postpone its investment decision. For a
joint analysis of intertemporal and ﬁnancial choices, see Panteghini (2007a and 2007b).
5The general form of the geometric Brownian motion is dΠt = αΠΠtdt+σΠtdzt where
αΠ is the expected rate of growth. If shareholders are risk neutral, in equilibrium we have
αΠ = r − δ, where r is the risk-free interest rate and δ is the so-called convenience (or
dividend) yield. For simplicity, in (1) we assume that αΠ = r − δ =0 . For further details
see McDonald and Siegel (1984 and 1985).
6Default is costly. Branch (2002) classiﬁes default costs in four categories: 1) costs
borne directly by the bankrupt ﬁrm; 2) costs faced directly by the claimants; 3) losses
to the bankrupt ﬁrm that are oﬀset by gains to other entities; 4) costs born by third-
party entities. By accounting for these categories he estimates a total default-related cost
ranging between 12.7% and 20.5%.
7For simplicity we disregard non-tax beneﬁts related to the fact that debt can reduce
agency conﬂicts between managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986).
2C ≤ Π0 as the coupon paid to the lender, and introduce the following:
Assumption 1 At time 0, the company borrows some resources and pays a
coupon C, which is not renegotiable.
Assumption 2 If Π drops to a threshold value, default occurs.
Assumption 3 The cost of default is υC with υ>0.
In line with Leland (1994), Assumption 1 means that a company sets a
coupon and then calculates the mark-to-market value of debt. In the absence
of arbitrage, this is equivalent to calculating the eﬀective interest rate for a
given amount of nominal debt.8 For simplicity, we also assume that debt
cannot be renegotiated: this means that we apply a static model, where a
company’s ﬁnancial policy cannot be reviewed later.9 Assumptions 2 and
3 introduce the risk and the cost of default, respectively. Given (1), it is
assumed that, if a company’s payoﬀ falls to a given threshold value, the
company cannot meet its obligation and is thus expropriated by the lender
(Assumption 2). In the event of default, the lender faces a sunk cost, that is
proportional to the coupon paid (Assumption 3).
To make the model more general we also assume that the lifetime of an
investment project is ﬁnite. Thus we introduce the following:
Assumption 4 Following a Poisson process, at any time t there is a prob-
ability λdt that the existing project dies during the short internal dt.
Assumption 4 introduces stochastic decay of capital, and thus entails that
the expected lifetime of an investment project is ﬁnite, although uncertain.10
8This means that the ratio between the coupon C and the mark-to-market value of
debt is equal to the eﬀective interest rate (i.e., the risk-free interest rate plus the default
premium).
9For a detailed analysis of dynamic strategies, with costly debt renegotiation, see e.g.
Goldstein et al. (2001), and Hennessy and Whited (2005).
10The quality of results would not change under deterministic depreciation. As shown
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), assuming a Poisson process gives the same result as assuming
a deterministic exponential decay of capital.
3Taxation Let us next focus on tax rules and introduce the following:
Assumption 5 Interest payments are fully deductible.
Assumption 6 Fiscal depreciation allowances are equal to λF ≷ λ times
the investment cost I.
Assumption 7 Before default, the lender’s relevant tax rate is zero.
Assumption 8 The tax system is fully symmetric.
Assumption 5 introduces the tax beneﬁt of interest deductibility.11 As-
sumption 6 states that ﬁscal depreciation allowances may diﬀer from eco-
nomic depreciation. Assumption 7 accounts for the fact that in most cases,
the tax burden on capital income is relatively low or even close to zero. In
this model the lender’s tax rate is equal to zero for simplicity. Notice how-
ever that, after default, the lender becomes shareholder and is thus subject
to corporate taxation. Assumption 8 allows us to analyze the eﬀects of tax-
ation in a symmetric framework.12 Given these assumptions we can write a
company’s after-tax payoﬀ as:
Π
N (Π;C)=( 1− τ)(Π − C)+τλFI.
Let us next calculate the value of equity and debt. Using dynamic pro-
g r a m m i n g ,w ec a nw r i t et h ev a l u eo fe q u i t ya st h es u mb e t w e e nt h ea f t e r - t a x
payoﬀ received in the interval dt, i.e., ΠN (Π;C)dt, and the value function
after the time interval dt has passed:13
11For simplicity, we do not account for rules aimed at limiting the deductibility of interest
payments, such as thin capitalization rules. Notice also that in 2008, both Germany and
Italy have abandoned thin capitalization rules a n di n t r o d u c e dan e wc o n s t r a i n to ni n t e r e s t
deductibility. According to this new device, if the amount of interest paid exceeds a given
percentage of EBITDA (30%), the exceeding part of interest payment is non-deductible,
but can be carried forward. For further details see, e.g., Eckhardt (2007) and Galeano and
Rhode (2008).
12We leave the analysis of tax asymmetries for future research.
13As shown by Niemann and Sureth (2005), under risk neutrality, contingent claim
analysis and dynamic programming lead to identical investment rules. For further details






ΠN (Π;C)dt +( 1− λdt)e−rdtξ [E (Π + dΠ;C)] before default.
(2)
A ss h o w ni n( 2 ) ,a ta n yp e r i o ddt, there is a probability λdt that the project
dies, and that the value of equity goes to zero. Following the same procedure





[(1 − τ)Π + τλFI]dt
+(1− λdt)e−rdtξ [D(Π + dΠ;C)] after default,
Cdt+( 1− λdt)e−rdtξ [D(Π + dΠ;C)] before default.
(3)
As can be seen, the value of debt is contingent on the event of sudden death
of capital. Since there is a probability λdt that a company’s proﬁtg o e st o
zero, in this case, the lender’s claim becomes worthless. This means that,
given Assumption 4, debt maturity is in line with the expected lifetime of
investment.14 Notice that, by assuming this fact, we depart from most of the
existing tax literature, which usually assumes that investment is ﬁnanced only
by default-free short-term debt, irrespective of a project’s expected lifetime
and riskiness (see, e.g., Devereux and Griﬃth, 1999).
Using (2) and (3) we can calculate a company’s Net Present Value (NPV),
i.e.,
V (Π;C)=E (Π;C)+D(Π;C) − I. (4)
Using (4) and setting τ =0 , we can also calculate the NPV in the absence
of taxation, denoted as VPT (Π;C). As pointed out by Devereux and Griﬃth
(1999), a natural measure of the ETR would be
[VPT(Π;C)−V (Π;C)]
VPT(Π;C) . However,
this ratio would be undeﬁned if VPT (Π;C)=0 . For this reason they propose
to scale the numerator by the present value of the pre-tax income stream,
net of depreciation. Following their advice, we calculate the eﬀective tax rate
as the ratio between the diﬀerence [VPT (Π;C) − V (Π;C)] and the present
14Graham and Harvey (2001) show that more than 63% of the US ﬁrms surveyed state
that debt maturity is aimed at matching with assets’ lifetime. Therefore, our assumption
is realistic.
5value of future payoﬀ, net of depreciation, i.e.,15
ETR =




In the following sections, we will apply Formula (5) to measure the ETR
under diﬀerent ﬁnancial strategies.
3P u r e d e b t
In this section we focus on pure debt ﬁnance. Following Smith and Warner
(1979), and Leland (1994) let us introduce two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of de-
fault:16
Deﬁnition 1 Under secured debt ﬁnance, default occurs when Π falls to an
exogenously given threshold point e Πs.
Deﬁnition 2 Under unsecured debt ﬁnance, the threshold point, denoted as
e Πu, is chosen optimally by shareholders at time 0.
According to Deﬁnition 1, default may be triggered when a company’s
payoﬀ falls to the exogenously given threshold point e Πs.T h i sd e ﬁnition refers
to secured debt, where default takes place when a company’s asset value falls
to the debt’s value.17
Under the Deﬁnition 2, when a company’s net cash ﬂow is negative, share-
holders can decide whether to inject further equity capital in order to meet
the company’s debt obligations or to default. As long as they issue new cap-
ital and pay the interest rate they can exploit a future recovery in proﬁtabil-
ity. This means that, under unsecured debt ﬁnance, shareholders behave as
if they owned a put option, whose exercise leads to default.18
15In the original Devereux-Griﬃth model, economic and ﬁscal depreciation allowances
coincide, whereas in our model they may diﬀer.
16For further details on default conditions see also Brennan and Schwartz (1977).
17As pointed out by Smith and Warner (1979, p. 127) "[s]ecuring debt gives bondholders
title to pledged assets until the bonds are paid in full".
18In this article, we assume that default happens the ﬁrst time a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow crosses
the threshold point. Yıldırım (2006) introduces an alternative deﬁnition of default, ac-
cording to which default occurs when a ﬁrm’s value process spends an exogenously given
amount of time below the threshold point. This is an interesting topic that we leave for
further research.
6Let us next calculate the value of equity. Using (2), applying Itô’s Lemma







2EΠΠ (Π;C) for Π > e Π
j. (6)














Π > e Πj,
(7)
with j = s,u,a n dw h e r eΨ(Π;C) ≡
(1−τ)(Π−C)+τλFI






σ2 < 0.T h e t e r m Ψ(Π;C) accounts for a scenario where no
change occurs, apart for the future death of the project. As can be seen, the
relevant discount rate is r +λ instead of r. The reason is explained by Dixit
and Pindyck (1994, p. 200): to deal with a stochastic decay of capital "we
can regard the project as inﬁn i t e - l i v e ,b u ta u g m e n tt h er a t ea tw h i c hf u t u r e
proﬁts are discounted by adding the Poisson death parameter". The latter









is the expected present value of the proﬁtl o s tb ys h a r e h o l d e r s
after expropriation.
We can now calculate the default threshold points under secured and
unsecured debt, respectively.
Secured debt According to Deﬁnition 1, full debt protection means





0, which implies that:
e Π




Unsecured debt To calculate the threshold value under unsecured
debt we follow Leland (1994). Therefore, e Πu is obtained by maximizing








β2 (λ) − 1
e Π
s < e Π
s. (10)
The inequality e Πu < e Πs can be explained as follows: under unsecured debt
ﬁnance, a company can inject equity in order to meet its debt obligations.
This means that, contrary to the secured-debt-ﬁnance case, a company can










Following the same procedure, we can now calculate the value of debt.






















Π > e Πj.
(11)
If Π > e Πj, the value of debt consists of two terms: a perpetual rent and a
term that is non-linear in Π. As we can see, the lender’s relevant discount rate
is r+λ: this means that debt maturity is in line with the expected lifetime of
investment. The second term measures the contingent value of the net cost
of default. After default (i.e., when Π has reached e Πj), the lender becomes














− (1 − Ωτ)I
is the value of an unlevered company, Ω ≡
λF












, with j = s,u,( 1 3 )
8is the net beneﬁto fd e b tﬁnance.19 As can be seen, Bj (C) depends on both
the tax rate and the default cost.20 In particular, it accounts for the fact
that in the event of default, the tax beneﬁt of interest deductibility is lost.
L e tu sn e x tc a l c u l a t et h ee ﬀective tax rate. Using (15), and setting τ =0 ,














υC measures the expected cost of default. Substituting















, with j = s,u. (15)
L e tu sn e x tc o m p a r eETRj with a standard measure of eﬀective taxation.
In the spirit of Devereux and Griﬃth (1999), let us omit default costs and
so we can write:
ETRzd = τ
Π





where zd stands for ’zero default’. By comparing (15) with (16), we can say
that:
Proposition 1 For any coupon C,w eh a v e
ETR







19To understand better the term Bj (C), let us compare (12) with the Modigliani-Miller
Formula, according to which the value of a levered company is equal to V = VU+τD,where
VU is the value of the unlevered company, and D is the value of debt (see Modigliani and
Miller, 1963, p. 440). According to the Modigliani-Miller approach, interest deductibility
raises the value of a levered ﬁrm by an amount equal to τ times the value of debt. This
means that the Modigliani-Miller Formula implicitly disregards the expected the cost of
default. Whenever we account for the contingent cost of default, we must substitute τD
with Bj (C), and we thus obtain (12).
20Maximizing the beneﬁt function Bj (C) we could obtain the optimal coupon under
both secured and unsecured, namely, Cu and Cs. As shown in Panteghini (2007a) we have
Cu >C s. The reasoning behind this result is as follows: under unsecured debt ﬁnancing
a company can decide when to default. Given its higher ﬁnancial ﬂexibility therefore, a
company can choose a higher leverage ratio.
9As shown in Proposition 1, the standard measure ETRzd is biased, in
that it disregards the expected cost of default and therefore overestimates
the net beneﬁto fd e b tﬁnance. Eq. (15) also shows that the ETR crucially
depends on the characteristics of debt as well as on the ratio between interest
payments and a company’s EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes), i.e.,
C/(Π − λI).
Notice that with Eq. (15) we can deal with either pure equity or pure
debt ﬁnance. In the ﬁrst case, we simply set C =0 . In the second case, we
set C = Cmax,w h e r eCmax is such that Dj (Π;Cmax)=I. Of course, we can
deal with an intermediate case if C ∈ (0,Cmax).21
It is worth noting that the relevant ETR crucially depends on whether








,w ec a ns a y
that:
Proposition 2 For any coupon C, the inequality ETRu <E TR s holds.
The reasoning behind Proposition 2 is simple: given (15) we can say that
the higher the expected cost of default, the higher the eﬀective tax rate is.
Since under unsecured debt ﬁnance, a company delays default, the expected
cost of default is lower than under secured debt. As a consequence, the
eﬀective tax rate is lower under unsecured than under secured debt ﬁnance.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that it is necessary to account for the charac-
teristics of debt, i.e., the likelihood of default, maturity, and the existence of
collateral (i.e., the default condition applied), to obtain an unbiased measure
of the ETR.
4 Hybrid securities
In this section we calculate the ETR when a company issues two well-known
hybrid securities: convertible and reverse convertible bonds. As we know, the
holder of a convertible bond owns a call option that allows him to convert
the bond into equity.22 When a company issues a reverse convertible bond,
21The intermediate case is in line with Boadway et al. (1984), who assume mixed ﬁnance
and provide a measure of the ETR derived from the use of the Weighted Average Cost of
Capital.
22A convertible bond usually has a relatively low coupon rate. This is due to the fact
that the bondholder receives not only a coupon but also owns a call option, that allows
10the issuer, rather than the bondholder, has the right to convert this bond
into equity. In this case, shareholders own a put option whose exercise leads
to the conversion of debt into equity.23 In this latter case, the issuer (i.e., the
c o m p a n y )c a nr e p a yt h eb o n de i t h e ri nc a s ho ri ns h a r e s .I ft h ev a l u eo ft h e
underlying share is low enough, the issuer repays the bond in shares.24 By
dealing with hybrid securities therefore, we implicitly focus on an investment
project which can be jointly ﬁnanced by debt and equity.25
For simplicity we assume that no capital gains tax is paid in the event of
conversion.26
4.1 Convertible bonds
Although convertible bonds are a well-know ﬁnancial instrument and their
use is widespread, they have not been considered to measure eﬀective tax-
ation. Contingent claim analysis allows us to calculate the fair value of
convertible bonds and so to measure the ETR when a company issues this
security.27
Let us deﬁne the default threshold point as Π, and denote Π as the trigger
point above which the bondholder’s option is exercised. For simplicity, we
assume that convertible debt is secured.28 This means that default takes
place at point:
Π = e Π
s. (18)
Let us also introduce the following:
him to convert the bond into equity. For a detailed analysis of convertible bonds see, e.g.,
Brennan and Schwartz (1977), and Ingersoll (1977).
23As explained by Laukkanen (2007), the underlying asset of reverse convertible bonds
can be the share of either the issuer or of a third listed company.
24A reverse convertible bond usually has a relatively high coupon rate. This high coupon
compensates the bondholder for the put option owned by the issuer. Since this option is
exercised if the shares underlying the option have fallen below a given level, the bondholder
will receive the equity rather than the principal and will lose any additional coupons.
25This is in the spirit of Boadway et al. (1984).
26Laukkanen (2007) provides a detailed analysis of the tax treatment of capital gains
arising from conversion.
27We could extend our analysis by assuming the joint use of equity, pure debt and
convertible bonds. However, the quality of results would not change.
28The quality of results does not change if we assume that convertible debt is unsecured,
i.e., shareholders can decide whether to inject further equity capital or not. Calculations
are available from the author.
11Assumption 9 The bondholder has a call option to convert debt into equity.
When he exercises this option, he acquires an exogenously given share of
equity capital equal to γ ∈ (0,1).
According to Assumption 9, the bondholder can decide when to exercise
his call option namely, he chooses Π. For simplicity, we assume that γ is
exogenously given.29 Following the same procedure of section 3, we can
write the value of equity and debt, respectively, as:
Ec (Π;C)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩


















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨


































perpetual rent that measures the value of a company in the absence of future
changes (apart from the stochastic decay of investment). If we compare (19)
and (20) with (7) and (11), respectively, we can see that, under convertible
bond ﬁnance, both the equity and the debt function have now a third branch.
This is due to the expected conversion of debt into equity. When Π reaches
Π, the bondholder ﬁnds it optimal to exercise the option to convert. By





,a n dl o s e sa n yf u t u r eﬂow of coupons. After the conversion,





29Notice that γ might be the result of a bargaining process, which would involve diﬀerent
stakeholders (see, e.g., Hennessy and Tserlukevich, 2005). This topic is beyond the scope
of our article.
12Using (19) and (20) we obtain:
Vc(Π;C)=
(1 − τ)Π + τC
r + λ






which accounts for three future events: default, conversion and the sudden
death of the investment project. It is worth noting that under convertible
debt ﬁnance, we have no closed-form solution: Appendix D therefore dis-
cusses the boundary conditions needed to obtain a numerical solution for Ai,
Di,w i t hi =1 ,2,a n dΠ.
Despite the absence of a closed-form solution, we can discuss the eﬀects of
contingent-claim evaluation on the eﬀective tax rate. Using (21) and setting








βi(λ) − I. (22)
Substituting (21) and (22) into (5) gives the ETR under convertible debt
ﬁnance:









A ss h o w ni n( 2 3 ) ,φc (τ,Π) m e a s u r e st h eb i a so fETRzd. Such a bias is due
to the sum of four terms, that depend on the fact that contingent evaluation
of future events under taxation diﬀers from that in the absence of taxation.
In particular, the term (A1|τ=0 − A1)Πβ1(λ) measures the tax wedge due to
shareholders’ expected loss after the conversion of debt into equity: in this
case, the existing shareholders lose a fraction γ of their company, which is
then acquired by the ex bondholders. The term (A2|τ=0 − A2)Πβ2(λ) mea-
sures the tax wedge regarding shareholders’ loss faced in the event of default.
The other two terms regard bondholders. In particular, (D1|τ=0 − D1)Πβ1(λ)
measures the tax wedge related to bondholders’ gain due to the exercise of
the option to convert. Finally, (D2|τ=0 − D2)Πβ2(λ) accounts for bondhold-
ers’ expected loss in the event of default.
134.2 Reverse convertible bonds
A reverse convertible bond gives the issuer the right to convert equity. In
other terms, the bond’s issuer (i.e., the shareholder) owns a put option, whose
exercise leads to the conversion of debt into a company’s shares.30
Denoting b Π as the threshold point above which conversion is made, we































. A sw ec a ns e e ,Erc(Π;C) has two




,s h a r e h o l d e r sﬁnd it optimal to pay a coupon C to
bondholders. When Π reaches b Π, shareholders exercise the option to convert









the bondholder receives C. However, he must
account for the fact that in the future, Π may drop to b Π. In this case, he




















DiΠβi(λ) Π > b Π.
(25)

































































measures the trigger point below which shareholders ﬁnd it optimal to exer-
cise their put option. We can therefore say that, if γ ∈ (0,1), b Π > e Πu.I n
other terms, the conversion of debt into equity takes place before the event
of default under pure debt ﬁnance. If γ =1 ,w eh a v eb Π = e Πu. This means
that unsecured debt is a special case of reverse convertible bond.31



















Substituting (28) and (29) into (5) gives:








Again, the ETR accounts for the contingent value of conversion. If we com-
pare (17) with (30) we can see that the ETR has the same form, although the









. This means that ETRrc >E T R u for
any C. Moreover, it is easy to see that ∂ETRrc
∂γ < 0: in other words, an
increase in γ reduces the trigger point b Π, and therefore lowers the expected
cost of default. This causes a decrease in ETRrc.W h e nγ goes to 1, the re-
verse convertible bond is equivalent to unsecured debt and therefore, ETRrc
collapses to ETRu.










Table 1: The parameter values for numerical simulations
5A n u m e r i c a l a n a l y s i s
To give a feeling of how the ETR depends on parameter values, we present
some numerical example. As shown in Table 1, we set r =0 .04 and σ =
0.20, which represent the benchmark assumptions used by Dixit and Pindyck
(1994, p. 153) and are consistent with empirical evidence.32 Moreover, we
assume that the depreciation rate λ is 0.05.33 We also assume that, in the
event of conversion of a hybrid security, the bondholder receives 30% of the
company (i.e., γ =0 .3). Moreover we will calculate the ETRs under two
alternative values of Π, i.e., 1.8 and 2.6. The former value means that a
company’s ROI (i.e., the ratio between Π − λI and I) is equal to 0.04 (i.e.,
the risk-free interest rate r); with Π =1 .8, we therefore calculate the marginal
ETR. The latter value entails a higher ROI, i.e., 0.09, which overcomes the
risk-free rate. In this case, we have a measure of the average ETR. For
simplicity, we will also assume that ﬁscal depreciation allowances coincide
with economic depreciation (i.e., λF = λ). In what follows, we will also make
some sensitivity analysis regarding parameters σ, γ, λ, C.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, under pure debt ﬁnance, a change in C
has an ambiguous impact on the ETR. If C is low enough, an increase in
leverage reduces the ETR. When however C reaches an intermediate point,
a further increase in leverage raises the ETR. This U-shaped eﬀect is due to
32See, e.g., Jorion and Goetzman (1999) and Dimson et al. (2002).
33Notice that λ usually ranges from 0 to 0.10. This range is in line with the average
depreciation rates reported in Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States,
1925-1989 (10% for equipment and 5% for structures) and is applied, e.g., by Caballero
and Engels (1999).
16two oﬀsetting eﬀects: the ﬁr s to n ei st h eb e n e ﬁt of tax deductions, while the
second one is related to the contingent value of the default cost. If therefore
C is low, an increase in leverage guarantees a relatively large tax saving in
terms of deductibility, and causes a small increase in the contingent value of
default costs. Given the low level of leverage, the probability of default is low
and therefore, the former eﬀect dominates the latter. When however C goes
beyond a given level, the converse is true, namely, we have a small increase
in tax savings, and a large increase in the contingent value of default costs.
This leads to an increase in the ETR.
L e tu sn e x tc o m p a r eF i g u r e s1a n d2 .W ec a ns e et h a t ,i nl i n ew i t hP r o p o -
sition 1, the inequality ETRs >E TR u always holds. Under unsecured debt
ﬁn a n c e ,t h eE T Rm a yb en e g a t i v e( s e eF i g u r e2 ) .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a t
the contingent cost of default is lower under unsecured than under secured
debt ﬁnance. Given the tax beneﬁt of interest deductibility, a company is
thus subsidized if C ranges from about 2 to 3.
Figure 1: The eﬀect of a change in C on ETRs (secured debt)
17Figure 2: The eﬀect of a change in C on ETRu (unsecured debt)
Figures 3 and 4 show the eﬀect of an increase in λ. As can be seen, the
higher the parameter λ, the lower the ETR. This is due to the fact that, given
λF = λ,a ni n c r e a s ei nλ l e a d st om o r eg e n e r o u sﬁscal depreciation allowances.
However, there is a second oﬀsetting eﬀect, that has been disregarded by the
existing literature: namely, debt maturity. As we pointed out, a higher λ
means a shorter debt maturity. We can therefore say that, for any Π0, the
higher the parameter λ, the shorter the maturity of debt and the higher the
probability of default is. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, however, the former
eﬀect dominates the maturity eﬀect. When λ is higher than 0.08, the ETR
becomes negative under both secured and unsecured debt ﬁnance.
18Figure 3: The eﬀect of a change in λ on ETRs (secured debt)
Figure 4: The eﬀect of a change in λ on ETRu (unsecured debt)
19Figures 5 and 6 show that an increase in σ raises the ETR. The reason is
simple: coeteris paribus, an increase in volatility raises the probability of de-
fault. This means that the contingent cost of default increases with volatility
and therefore, leads to a higher ETR.
Figure 5: The eﬀect of a change in σ on ETRs (secured debt)
Figure 6: The eﬀect of a change in σ on ETRu (unsecured debt)
20Let us next focus on hybrid securities. Since we have no closed-form
solution under convertible bond ﬁnance, Figure 7 shows how the values of
Ai, Di,w i t hi =1 ,2,a n dΠ vary with the statutory tax rate. We can also
see that:
• (A1|τ=0 − A1)Πβ1(λ), i.e., the tax wedge due to shareholders’ expected
loss in terms of proﬁt, is negative;
• (A2|τ=0 − A2)Πβ2(λ), i.e., the tax wedge regarding shareholders’ loss
faced in the event of default, is positive;
• (D1|τ=0 − D1)Πβ1(λ), i.e., the tax wedge related to bondholders’ gain
due to the exercise of the option to convert, is positive;
• (D2|τ=0 − D2)Πβ2(λ), i.e., the tax wedge related to bondholders’ ex-
pected loss in the event default, is negative.
A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e7 ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t er a i s e sp o i n tΠ, i.e.,
induces a postponement of conversion. The reason is straightforward: for
any Π, the higher the tax rate, the lower a company’s after-tax cash ﬂow is.
This means that the relative advantage of becoming shareholder is negatively
aﬀected by the tax rate.
21Figure 7: The eﬀect of a tax rate change on Ai, Di,w i t hi =1 ,2,a n dΠ,
under convertible debt.
In Figure 8 we compare the standard measure ETRzd,w i t ht h eE T R
obtained under both convertible and reverse convertible debt. We assume
that Π =1 .8 (i.e., Π−λI
I = r). As we can see, both ETRzd and ETRrc are


















Figure 8: The eﬀect of an increase in the statutory tax rate on the ETR
(Π =1 .8)
F i g u r e8a l s os h o w st h ee ﬀect of a change in the statutory tax rate on
ETRrc. As we can see, the equality ETRrc = τ holds for τ ≤ 0.3158.T h i s
is due to the fact that, if the statutory tax rate is low enough (i.e., τ ≤
0.3158), we have Π ≤ b Π. In other words, conversion has already occurred,
and therefore, we have a fully equity ﬁnanced company. In this case the ETR
is equal to the statutory tax rate. When τ rises however, conversion has not
already occurred (i.e., Π > b Π): this means that a company enjoys from the
tax beneﬁt of interest deductibility, at least for some time. As we can see,
the bias (ETRrc − ETRzd) is more than 100% of the statutory tax rate.
Figure 9 shows the eﬀects of an increase in τ on ETRzd, ETRc,a n d
ETRrc, with Π =2 .6 (i.e., Π−λI
I =0 .009 >r ). In this case the ETRs are all















Figure 9: The eﬀect of an increase in the statutory tax rate on the ETR
(Π =2 .6)
Finally, it is worth noting that, in both Figures 8 and 9 (i.e., for diﬀerent
values of a ﬁrm’s ROI) the inequalities ETRrc >E T R zd >E T R c hold.
A sw eh a v es h o w ni n( 3 0 ) ,w eh a v eETRrc >E T R zd. This inequality is
due to the fact that ETRrc embodies the contingent impact of conversion,
that reduces the tax advantage of debt. The inequality ETRzd >E T R c is
due to the fact that the overall tax wedge φc (τ,Π) of Eq. (23) is negative.
This means that the contingent evaluation of conversion and default under
taxation is less than that obtained in the absence of taxation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this article we have applied contingent-claim analysis to provide a forward-
looking measure of eﬀective taxation that accounts for default, debt maturity,
and the conversion of debt into equity. In particular, we have calculated the
ETR under secured and unsecured debt ﬁnance, and we have also provided
a measure of the ETR under convertible and reverse convertible bond issue.
We have shown that our contingent-claim ETR can dramatically diﬀer from
standard ones.
The contingent-claim measure of the ETR can be extended by consid-
ering other hybrid securities. Moreover, in this article we have used many
simplifying assumptions, such as tax symmetry, the absence of agency costs
24and of any bargaining process between stakeholders (including renegotia-
tion). Of course, the elimination of any of these simplifying assumptions is
an interesting topic for future research.
25A The derivation of (7)
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are the roots of the characteristic Eq. Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) − (r + λ)=0 .
As can be seen, the before-default value of equity consists of two terms: the
perpetual rent, in square brackets, and
2 X
i=1
AiΠβi(λ). Let us next calculate
A1 and A2. In the absence of any ﬁnancial bubbles, A1 is nil (see Dixit and














+ A2Πβi(λ) before default. (32)
To calculate A2, we must notice that when default occurs, i.e., when Π drops







with e Πj = e Πs, e Πu, because the ﬁrm is expropriated by the lender. Substitut-
i n g( 3 2 )i n t o( 3 3 )w eﬁnd A2, and rearranging we obtain (7).
B The derivation of (10)
Using (7) and diﬀerentiating (9) gives the following f.o.c.
∂Eu(Π)






















Rearranging (34) one obtains (10).
26C The derivation of (11)




[(1 − τ)Π + τλFI]+σ2
2 Π2DΠΠ(Π;C) Π < e Πj,
C + σ2
2 Π2DΠΠ(Π;C) Π > e Πj.
(35)
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DiΠβi(λ) measure the contingent value of
future events after and before default, respectively. To calculate B2 we use
the boundary condition Dj (0;C)=0 , which means that when Π falls to
zero, the lender’s post-default claim is nil, and so we have B2 =0 .I n t h e
absence of any ﬁnancial bubble, we also have B1 = D1 =0 .T oc a l c u l a t eD2
we let the pre-default branch of (36) meet with its after-default one, net of













Solving (37) for D2 gives
D2 =
"












,w i t hj = s,u,
and substituting this solution into (36) one obtains (11).
D Convertible bonds
In order to calculate the value of convertible bonds, the following conditions
must hold. Firstly, we know that, under default, expropriation occurs. Using














βi(λ) =0 . (38)
Secondly, the second and third branch of function Ec (Π;C) meet at point

























Thirdly, when default takes place, the value of debt is equal to the value of















Fourthly, when conversion occurs, the second and third branch of (20) meet


















We also know that the bondholder can optimally decide when to convert,
namely he chooses point Π. Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), we thus
introduce a Smooth Pasting Condition (SPC), where the second and third
branch of (20) meet tangentially at point Π = Π. Since the SPC requires the



























γ (1 − τ)
r + λ
. (42)
Solving the system (38), (39), (40), (41), (42), we obtain Π,A 1,A 2,D 1,D 2.
28E Reverse convertible bonds
Let us ﬁrst focus on equity. We know that, in the absence of bubbles, we
have A1 =0 . Moreover, applying the VMC and SPC to (24), we obtain:
"
(1 − τ)







β2(λ) =( 1− γ)
"









+ β2 (λ)A2b Π




Solving (43) and (44) for b Π and A2 gives
b Π =
β2 (λ)











γ (1 − τ)
β2 (λ)(r + λ)
b Π
1−β2(λ).
The value of equity is thus equal to (26).
Let us next calculate the value of debt. In the absence of bubbles we have






















Using the solution for D2 and rearranging gives (27).
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